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ON FREE WILL 




BY 

REV. ALAN S. HAWKESWORTH 

CLERK IN HOLY ORDERS 



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ALBANY, N. Y.: 
RIGGS PRINTING COMPANY, 

/ 1896. 







3 






Copyright, 1896, 

By 

A. S. HAWKESWORTH. 



ON FREE WILL. 



If, in the history of our human race, there is one question on 
which more brain toil, more genius, and more terrible agony of 
body, mind, and soul, has been expended than on any other, it is 
probably on this question of the freedom of man's will. Is he, on 
the one hand, merely the creature of circumstances ? — a being 
doomed to an iron fatalism from which there is, and can be, no pos- 
sible escape? — or is he, on the contrary, a being endowed with a 
free will? — a power of guiding to some extent his own destinies 
— and therefore a being amenable to judgment, to punishment, or 
reward. 

Now it may be said, and possibly justly said, that in a discussion 
so old as this, a discussion too that has enlisted some of the ablest, and 
subtlest minds of our race, little now can remain to be advanced. 
Nevertheless it is to the very daring notion that living men can do 
better than the wisest of their fore fathers, that human progress is 
entirely due; and I am therefore/with this reward of daring be- 
fore my eyes, encouraged to contribute my quota towards the solu- 
tion of this ancient, and sphinx like riddle ; it is for my readers to 
judge of the success that has been mine. 

But before commencing the discussion I would like, first of all 
to accurately define the meaning of some of the terms we are to 
use. Old Homer declares that "wide is the range of words, this 
way and that" (Iliad, xx, 249), and a true saying it is. 
Take any of the sciences of thought — Metaphysics, Phil- 
osophy, or Theology — and I think that both history, and 
experience will show us that nine-tenths of the misun- 
derstandings, misconceptions, and false and heretical thought 
so prevalent in these sciences is due, simply and entirely, 
to a loose, and inaccurate phraseology. One thinker expresses an 



idea by one word, another thinker the same idea by another word; 
result, mutual misunderstanding: or again, a writer will use a 
word in one sense, and shortly after uses it in a different sense ; re- 
sult, confusion, and false thought. 

Let us then, before attempting to "prove" free will, first of all 
define what we mean by "proving" a thing, and then go on to see 
what kind of "proofs" are in this instance valid. 

Now we may say that "proving" a thing is first knowing a 
thing, and secondly communicating that knowledge to other per- 
sons, and showing how, and why a thing is so. 

But again this term "knowledge" is, I think used for two very 
diverse, and indeed opposite workings of the mind, namely knowl- 
edge "a priori," or deductive, and knowledge "a posteriori," or in- 
ductive. This being as it follows that there are also two kinds of 
"proofs," again "a priori," and "a posteriori," corresponding to 
these two classes of knowledge. 

To elucidate my meaning. "A priori," or deductive knowledge, 
is knowing a thing from its origin to its result — from its "why" to 
its "how." It is therefore knowing a thing as it is "in itself," and 
is absolute, perfect, and final knowledge. 

. Thus if you give a mathematician the factors of a sum, he will 
work it out, and will know "a priori" the result: or to alter the 
illustration, describe to a mechanician a given arrangement of 
cog wheels, ratchets, and pinions, and he knows "a priori" the re- 
sultant machine, and what it can accomplish. So too, describe 
to an astronomer a certain planet or comet, and the laws that gov- 
ern its motion, and he will trace out for you its future path, and 
where it will be at a certain time. These then are all illustrations 
of "a priori" knowledge, a mental operation working from the 
"data" to its result — from the "why" to the "how" — giving us, 
I repeat, the knowledge of a thing as it is "in itself," and there- 
fore perfect, absolute, and final. 

Furthermore, I would like to point out, this knowing a thing 
"a priori" implies an "imaging" it forth in the mind, an "ideal 
creation," corresponding to the "Divine Ideals" of Plato, and the 
Schoolmen, those archetypes of Creation. In other words this 



"a priori" knowledge is, primarily and principally, the "knowl- 
edge" that the Godhead has, "imaging forth" His Creation. Yet 
inasmuch as man is in the image of God, he has a portion of this 
power, and can to some small extent "know" things "a priori" (as 
in the instances given) ; or, in other words, can be a Creator, both 
ideally in his brain, and actually in the external world. 

This then is "a priori" knowledge; knowledge, I repeat, per- 
fect, absolute, final, and implying an "ideal creation." 

But the second mental process, to which we also apply the term 
"knowledge," is of a totally different type. It is, in fact, the re- 
verse operation to the former, is "a posteriori," or inductive, as 
that is "a priori," or deductive: it is, in short, a blind groping 
from the "how," to the "why" — from the manifestation, to the 
reality as it is "in itself," — or, in philosophical language, from the 
"phenomenon" to the "noumenon." 

The vast majority of our '"knowledge" is of this character, as 
our "knowledge" of the external world around us, of the various 
phenomena of life, even our "knowledge" of our Creator, aye! 
and even of the depths of our own being. This type of "knowl- 
edge" is, as you will perceive, capable of degrees, is external, 
fragmentary, incomplete, and exceedingly apt to mislead. It is, 
in short, the empirical, sensational, and partial "knowledge" of 
the creature, as opposed to the ideal, creative, and perfect "knowl- 
edge" of the Creator. 

"Now corresponding to these two diverse, and opposite types of 
"knowledge" — "a priori," and "a posteriori" — there are, it seems 
to me, also two classes of "proofs," or manifestations of our 
knowledge, again "a priori," and "a posteriori." 

Thus, to return to my previous illustration, the mechanician 
"images" forth his machine, and "knows" it "a priori," and so is 
able to "prove" it to you, also "a priori," by "imaging" forth to 
you the various sequences in the chain of its creation. This is an 
exact, and perfect "proof," satisfying the mathematical sense. 

On the other hand we have the "a posteriori" proof, showing 
that a thing is so, or probably so, by its consequences. 

Thus if we were required to prove the reality of the external 



world, we would be unable to do so "a priori/' not being its crea- 
tors, but must proceed to do so "a posteriori," — or empirically — 
by pointing to its results — its persistence with us, our constant 
reliance upon it, and the practical necessity of our so treating it 
as real. 

This class of "proofs" then are, as you will notice, empirical, 
sensational, and "common sense," and are only probable in a 
greater or less degree. They can never, in short, reach absolute 
and necessary certainty, as the former — or "a priori" — class of 
proofs do. 

Having made this vital distinction between the two types of 
"knowledge" — "a priori," and "a posteriori," — and the result- 
ant two types of "proofs" — again "a priori," and "a posteriori", — 
I will now proceed to inquire which of these two classes of 
"proofs" are valid for the establishment of the philosophic truth 
of our free will. 

Assuredly not "a priori" proofs, for we are not God, to create 
ourselves "de novo," even ideally. !N~or are facts, or arguments, 
drawn from our consciousness, or from the external world, avail- 
able in this connection; for free will is, as I will show, a primal 
fact of consciousness, ranking with our consciousness of an exter- 
nal world, and only second to the prime certainty of our own in- 
dividual existence. To endeavour then to "prove" free will by 
"a priori" arguments, or corolleries, deduced from external 
phenomena, would involve us in the absurdity of trying to prove 
a more certain, by a less certain — a prime fact of consciousness, by 
the minor facts, or deductions of experience or reason. 

The only class then of arguments that are at all available in this 
case are the "a posteriori" ones of congruous effects. In other 
words, having first shown "free will" to be a primary fact of con- 
sciousness, and therefore not to be denied, we can then go on to 
make assurance doubly sure by pointing to common every day 
experience, and the other facts of the case, and showing that the 
practical workings of our nature are in accordance with this neces- 
sary theory of free will. 



Having made these preliminary and needful remarks let us 
now proceed to discuss the various philosophical arguments in the 
case. 

To begin then we may say that the arguments for fatalism, 
and against any free will in man, may be briefly summed up under 
three heads, first the "religious" argument, secondly the "scien- 
tific" one, and thirdly the appeal to experience, and facts in the 
observed phenomena of "atavism." 

As to the "religious" argument, it is alleged that our Creator, 
being Omniscient, must perforce know what our future actions 
will be: from this it follows that our future actions being fore- 
known, they must also be inevitable ; and if inevitable, then they 
must have been fore-ordained, or pre-destined by some Almighty 
power; and Who should that Power be but our Creator Him- 
self? 

This then is the argument from the Omniscience of God, and 
is, it will be noticed, the reasoning underlying not only the Cal- 
vanistic fatalism, but also that of Mohammedanism, and of other 
Eastern systems older still; taking its origin from a Theism that, 
among all the Infinite Attributes of the Godhead, feels only, and 
dwells only on His Wisdom, and above all on His Power; a The- 
ism, in fact, closely akin to the monergism of Pantheism. 

A very good presentation of this phase of thought is given us 
in the Rubaiyet of Omar Khayyam (Lxxiii), where it is said: 

"With earth's first clay they did the last man knead 
"and there of the last harvest sowed the seed 
"and the first morning of creation wrote 
"what the last dawn of reckoning; shall read" 



*-& 



But leaving until later the consideration of this "religious" 
fatalism, let us pass on to the second, and more weighty line of ar- 
gument (and the one I will therefore first answer), which is of a 
totally different class, and springs rather from what is known at 
the present day as a "scientific spirit." 

Men who have studied Nature in her manifold activities point 
to the world around us, and bid us observe everywhere the reign 



6 

of uniform laws, and causation. To make a familiar comparison 
one may liken it to a child's card house, where the fall of the first 
card pushes down in turn its companion cards, until the motion 
has passed through the whole set ; this is not at all a bad illustra- 
tion of w T hat is known as "the law of sequence, and universal 
causation in Xature," and of "conservation of force." Whatever 
happens, it is said, has been inexorably caused by an occurrence in 
the past, and inexorably causes in its turn some other event in the 
future: it follows then that whatever happens, must happen, is, 
in fact, merely a link in the chain of universal causation, — and 
that in this chain there is, and can be, no possible break. "Free 
will!!" exclaims the Necessitarian philosopher, "it is but the 
mocking shadow of man's romantic longings, the vain surmisings 
of his idle regrets ; man is but the mere battle ground of contend- 
ing emotions and desires, the helpless, and hopeless captive of cir- 
cumstances and events." 

Well to this the following "a posteriori" arguments may at once 
be objected. If, in the first place, man's soul is the "battleground 
of contending emotions, and desires," then the very fact of these 
emotions being contending conclusively shows, I think, that these 
emotions, like the external phenomena that give rise to them, are 
outside of the citadel of the will. Surely in no sense can it be said 
that these external phenomena, and the impressions, and emotions 
arising from them, are originators — creators — of our will; they 
are rather coveted things — attractions — to be weighed by our 
pre-existent will, "pro," and "con" in making a decision. Emo- 
tions "per se" have certainly no concrete, prior, or separate ex- 
istence ; but can only be predicated as being passing phases in the 
councils of a pre- existent volition, or free will: and again, any idea 
of "contending emotions" in a machine, or automaton is absurd on 
the face of it. 

Still further we can point out that this "romantic longing," 
this wish, nay! (he very conception itself of free will, proves its 
existence. The very ability man has of conceiving such a thing 
as "free will" — "volition" — at all, proves that however much he 
may be dominated by adverse circumstances, yet the utmost that 



can truthfully be said is that his actions are limited by, not pro- 
duced by, these circumstances; otherwise his conceptions would 
never, and could never set against them : for observe, free action 
is by no means necessary to the existence of free will; an inno- 
cent man's hand may be seized by an assassin, armed with a dag- 
ger, and driven to a stranger's heart ; but the forced action in no 
sense, and in no way, affects the freedom of his will, and conse- 
quently his abhorence, and innocence of the crime. 

But we can go even deeper than this, and say that not only is 
this conception, and consciousness we possess of free will a strong 
argument in its favour, but also that it is the 'prime argument in 
the case. 

In the first place it is generally true that our primal intuitions 
are the basis of all our knowledge ; not only our religious princi- 
ciples, and our ethics, but even those things that we look upon as 
most indubitable — our mathematical science, and even the exist- 
ence of a material world around us — are all ultimately based on 
the intuitional, or necessary knowledge of our intellectual nature. 
ISTow, as Aristotle well said, "they who reject the testimony of 
self evident truth, will find nothing surer on which to build," and 
the man therefore who refuses to credit his natural perception of 
his own free will, and styles it a "self delusion," is, in reality, cut- 
ting away the ground on which every argument, and every per- 
ception of truth must be based. 

But more than this: in thus refusing to credit his own percep- 
tions of free will, he is not merely denying necessary truth in gen- 
eral, but is, in particular, suicidically destroying the very platform 
on which his whole argument rests. 

If we go down to the root of the matter we will find, I think, 
that our conceptions of necessary cause and effect take, in the first 
place, their origin from our natural intuitions as to our own power 
of prime origination. I form a certain volition, perform a certain 
act, and from this act I perceive certain results to follow: from 
this sequence I deduce by analogy a law of cause and effect in 
general, and apply it to the world around me; and, if I am a 
scientist, I call this analogy "the law pf sequence, and universal 



causation. " I furthermore, if I am a thoughtful man, perceive 
that while I can originate motion, no such power is observable in 
the material world around me; it can merely transmit, or hand 
on, motion, and that by reason of its inertia, or deadness, which 
will not suffer it to either add, or take away, one iota from the sum 
total committed to it: this fact I then denominate "the law of the 
conservation of force." But since the material world cannot 
originate force, and since both my experience, and my intuitions 
teach me that force, equally with matter, cannot originate itself, 
I am therefore led to predicate a Great Primal Cause — a God of 
all — Who is the Creator, and Upholder of the Universe Around 
me, and of its manifold activities. 

So then from my intuitions as to my power of prime origin- 
ation,- or a free will" spring not only my conceptions of "necessary 
cause and effect" in general, but also of a Great Creator of all in 
particular. In fact our conception of "cause, and effect," as a 
prominent Agnostic, and Necessitarian philosopher has pointed 
out, is altogether an anthropomorphic one (as indeed all our con- 
ceptions are, and must be), and it has even been denied to be cer- 
tainly true on those very grounds. It therefore follows, as I have 
already stated, that the man who adduces "the law of universal 
causation in Nature" as a reason for denying the truth of our in- 
tuitions of free will, is, in reality, cutting from under him the very- 
grounds on which his whole argument is based. And this con- 
sideration disposes too of the argument from "the law of the con- 
servation of force;" for any "law of conservation" must, to be in- 
telligible, be based on the primary law of "cause and effect;" or 
in other words, on the inability, on the one hand, of an effect to 
be without an adequate cause (as would be the case if the sum 
total of force were increased) ; or in the other, of a cause to be 
without an adequate effect (as would be the case if the sum total 
of force were diminished). But if we treat our instinctive feeling 
of free will and origination as a baseless phantasy, on what pos- 
sible grounds can we predicate such a thing as "cause and effect" 
at all? 



"Arguing in a circle" has always been held to be an utterly in- 
consequent and delusive act; but the "Necessitarian school" even 
disprove themselves "in a circle/' their argument ending, as I 
have shown, by denying the very intuitions and axioms upon 
which it is based ! ! 

This is such a self evident, and flagrant absurdity that we need 
hardly call attention to the lesser, yet still vital one, of attempt- 
ing to confute "a priori" a prime fact of consciousness (namely 
free will), by the secondary and derived facts of experience and 
reason (namely the laws of "cause and effect," and of "conserva- 
tion of force"). 

In this connection should be noticed the very significant and 
ominous fact, so clearly, and repeatedly illustrated in history, that 
those philosophies that begin by denying "free will," logically go 
on to also deny "free thought," and "self consciousness," suicidi- 
cally styling them "the delusive phantasies of a fancied individ- 
uality." In short it is undeniably certain, both logically, and 
historically, that "free will," "free thought," and "self conscious- 
ness of personality" are indissolubly linked together, and are all 
necessary to one another, and to intellectual sanity. 

Taking then, as we must, our intuitions of a free will as valid, 
we may say we instinctively feel that we, as free spiritual beings, 
are above, and outside of, the chain of causes in material Nature: 
this, I repeat, is a prime fact of consciousness, and must be ac- 
cepted as a self evident truth, if we are to have any basis for argu- 
ment, or knowledge at all. 

But to still further enforce this truth, and to assure us (if as- 
surance can be needed!), that we are not deluded by these our 
primal intuitions, we can point to still other "a posteriori" proofs 
of our free will, such as the following : 

In the first place, not only can we originate motion, but we can 
also mould, or modify existent phenomena; and again we can 
also, to some limited extent, apprehend, analyse, and comprehend, 
the laws of Material Nature; I need hardly point out that this 
power of comprehension, imperfect as it may be, yet implies a 
separateness from, and superiority to, the thing comprehended 



10 

(i. e. Material Nature) in that respect : we become, in fact, to some 
small extent, Nature's Gods, by thus exercising our powers of 
"ideal creation. 77 

Self consciousness too, as already noticed, is another phenom- 
enon that points the same way. In its very essence it implies a 
personality — an "I," and a "not I," — and a self limitation; and 
so a separateness from, and superiority to, Material Nature; and 
therefore a freedom from its causation; for a Necessitarianism 
springing from "universal causation in Nature" can only be pred- 
icated of something that is an integral part in the machinery of 
the Material world ; and so far as a thing is separate from Material 
Nature, so far is it also separate from the chain of causation in 
Material Nature. 

Again we may ask what possible interconnection is there be- 
tween material laws, and spiritual powers ? Gravity, heat, colour, 
what possible fellowship have they with thought, conscience, or 
volition? Surely the two classes of phenomena seem absolutely 
non-related. 

And finally we may lay it down as an axiom that a sentient be- 
ing must perforce possess free will, as without this power thought 
would be impossible. Abeve I have used the expression "power 
of prime origination" as synonymous with "free will," and rightly 
so ; but yet looking at the matter more minutely we may say that 
"'prime origination" is rather the will in action, and that the ulti- 
mate intrinsic note of free will is perhaps more strictly the "power 
of choice." 

Now if we endeavor to trace the operations of thought, we will, 
I think, find it to be somewhat as follows: firstly, certain sensa- 
tions arising from external phenomena are presented to the pre- 
existent mind, which then proceeds to "think" of them, or in other 
words to codify, and arrange these sensations, first by an act of 
synthesis, producing experience, and then by an act of analysis, pro- 
ducing knowledge (that is, "a posteriori" knowledge) ; and it is in 
this codifying, and arranging — this choosing, and shifting the 
phenomena presented to the mind — that thought essentially con- 
sists. Sensations "per se" are not thought (as the "Sensational 



11 

school" wrongly supposes), but are rather the subjects of thought; 
the ability for which is, and must be, external, and prior to these 
sensations. Or to put the thing in a more metaphysical way, be- 
fore a sensation can be apprehended, and become knowledge, the 
intellect must read into it previous categories: and if our intel- 
lect could not so interpret it, if, in other words, it were possible 
that the sensation, or thing, as our mind apprehended it, was "non- 
related/ 7 or out of the necessary relations of likeness, and of con- 
trast to other known things, then in such a case it would be, so 
far as we are concerned, no thing at all. 

This will explain the well known fact that a man can see (to 
take one class of sensations) only what his mind allows him to see ; 
and that, with the same identical sense perceptions, a farmer, and 
a hunter, will view a very different landscape. 

k * Thought" then consists of, first apprehension, secondly syn- 
thesis, and thirdly analysis: it follows then that the "power of 
choice," to enable this analysis to be made, is an absolute neces- 
sity for thought; an automaton, or even a person temporarily 
guided by another's will (such as a hypnotised person is claimed 
to be), because it, or he, cannot choose, cannot therefore think, 
It is therefore true that, as I have stated above, every sentient 
being must perforce possess free will. 

In fact, as an ultimate analysis will, I think, show us, free will 
is the vital core, not only of thought, but of personality itself. It 
is, in other words, the prime, and essential note of differentation 
from the surrounding universe, the vital, and primal element then 
of a self-conscious, self-determined, and self-contained individ- 
uality. This coincides with what is said above of the vital con- 
nection between free will, free thought, and self consciousness 
of personality. 

But the above arguments, while they show the freedom of our 
spiritual being from the laws of necessity in Material Nature, 
at the same time also show us that our material tabernacle — our 
body — is subject to the laws of "universal, and necessary causa- 
tion" in general, just as it is subject to one of these laws in particu- 
lar, that namely of "gravitation." In short we may rightly con- 



12 

elude that in so far as a man is spiritually considered, he is free; 
but in so far as he is material, he is predestined; or in other words 
that while " universal causation " does not govern, yet i{ circum- 
scribes him. 

This formula of "circumscribed, not governed" will, I think, 
elucidate, and show us the proper bearing of the puzzling ques- 
tion of "Atavism," or in other words "inherited peculiarities," a 
phenomenon in our highly complex beingjhat is often brought 
forward as a third argument for Necessitarianism. 

Now it is true that no one who studies human nature can shut 
his eyes to the constantly observed fact that the peculiarities 
and idiosyncrasies of parents and ancestors are constantly being 
reproduced in their offspring. Tricks of manner, and modes of 
thought — predispositions to various faults and vices on the one 
hand, or to virtues and talents on the other — recur in the same 
family again and again. How often we see a child reproduce 
with startling, and well nigh photographic accuracy the person- 
ality of a grandfather, or great grandfather ; who has not repeat- 
edly observed this phenomenon, and observing been struck by it? 
But on the other hand we have also the well known fact that no 
one can predict the future of a child : there will be three brothers, 
sons of the same parents, with the same inherited peculiarities 
and dispositions, the same training, and the same influences in 
all respects brought to bear on them, so far as we can see; yet each 
one of those three lives will be different; how different, until 
actually lived, who can tell? 

In fact similar laws to those which obtain in biology, obtain 
also here. We have first the law 7 of "the permanence of type," 
determining with unswerving rule that like can only produce like, 
and that animals continue after their kind. But conjoined to this 
law, and balancing it, is its opposite, and correlative one "Evo- 
lution," or "development," determining that the type advances, 
or degrades, becomes better, or worse, according as it is moulded 
by each individual's life. 

So too in human character; each one of us has at his birth a 
pre-determined, or inherited nature — body, and disposition — 



13 

give him; which said nature we proceed to develop into a char- 
acter, good, or bad, by our daily lives. To apply the imagery of 
a well known parable, we may say that each of us, at his entrance 
into life, has given into his hands an inheritance of pre-determin- 
ed "talents" — five, two, or one, — which inheritance we then pro- 
ceed to augment, or diminish, until death lays us low, and we are 
called to a solemn reckoning for the use of the treasure com- 
mitted to our care. In short "Atavism" decides where a man 
shall start from, it rests ultimately with himself which way he 
will go; and we are plainly taught that "of him to whom much 
has been given, much will be required;" or in other- words, that 
our standard of judgment will not be the hard, and fast one of 
actual deeds, but will rather be a "sliding scale," in which individ- 
ual inheritance, opportunities, and comparative results, will be 
the factors. 

In truth a little consideration will show us that this "law of de- 
velopment" must needs be a factor in the problem, or there would 
be no such thing as human history at all, or a race of human be- 
ings such as the present. For, scientifically speaking, it is at least 
probable that all the human race have sprung from one pair of 
progenitors ; and even were this denied, yet it is absolutely certain 
that millions of the human family have common ancestors. Now 
had the law of "Atavism" no balancing and correcting law of 
"development," such as I have pointed out above, how could we 
possibly account for the numberless observed peculiarities of 
disposition, and type ? There are in this world as many differing 
characters as there are individuals ; were the law of Atavism alone 
true, all these human beings should be as alike as the peas in a 
pod; and as for human "history," it would be a misnomer, the 
story would be as mathematically regular and eventless as the 
story of the revolutions of a planet ! ! 

So much then for the argument from "Atavism," a fact of our 
complex and finite being, and yet one in no way contradicting, or 
impairing the prime verity of the freedom of our will. To re- 
peat in brief my foregoing conclusions we may say that this 
"power of choice," or "free will," is an essential power of the spir- 



14 

itual Ego; which yet, inasmuch as it works through a material 
body, is circumscribed (not governed) by the material laws of 
necessary sequence affecting that body: and furthermore; seeing 
that our Spirit can comprehend and govern "matter" — be in 
short, its "god," — we can, by the due use of our opportunities, so 
bend and sway Material Mature to our will, both in our bodies 
and in the external world, as to render practically inappreciable 
the circumscribing wall of material laws. 

Finally let us consider the first argument for Necessitarianism 
that I noticed, the one namely that our Creator, being Omnis- 
cient, and Almighty, foreknows what our future actions will be 
which therefore must be inevitable, and predestined by Him. 

Yet is not this an idea founded on a misconception arising from 
words? We give a name, and forthwith proceed to argue from 
that name ! 

Speaking with all solemnity and reverence, may we not say 
that there are things that Omnipotence cannot do, such as make 
"a round square," and that because such a thing would be a mis- 
nomer — a self contradiction. To advance Infinity as a reason 
for performing self contradictions is absurd; as well might we 
argue that infinite parallel right lines must include a space, be- 
cause they are infinite : absurdity multiplied by infinity is certain* 
lyy not less an absurdity than before; on the contrary, it is 
"infinitely absurd." 

Now, reverting to our above conclusions as to the free will of 
man's spirit, on the one hand, and the sequence of material causa- 
tion in his body, on the other, we may say that our Creator has an 
absolutely perfect foreknowledge of the latter. ]\Ian even, by 
his empirical acquaintance; with some natural laws, can to some 
extent foreknow, and predict occurrences in the natural world. 
But this knowledge, partial, imperfect, and "a posteriori" in man, 
is absolute, perfect, and "a priori" in the Great Creator, and 
Originator of all: lie Who, not formed, but forms all Nature, 
and is its Omnipresent and Omniscient Underlying Reality, does 
and must have absolute foreknowledge of all the infinite se- 
quences in His Universe. 



15 

But granting that man, in his spiritual being, has a free will — 
a power of choice, and of prime origination — (and as I have 
shown above, we must acknowledge this as true, or else have no 
possible base to argue from), then, I say, to state that whatever 
his free will may originate in the future, can be, and is fore- 
known, is a flagrant contradiction in terms, seeing that what may 
be originated in the future is a non entity — is, in other words, not 
in existence now, either actually, or in embryo. It is no contra 
diction then, but a valid distinction, to say that while Omniscient 
Wisdom does, and must foreknow, and fore-ordain, in accordance 
with set laws, man's bodily nature — his inherited disposition, — 
yet Omniscience neither knows, nor fore-ordains, his future de- 
velopment and character; on which, and on which alone, his fu- 
ture judgment will depend. This distinction does justice both 
to our inherent beliefs in God's government of His world, and to 
our intuitions of a judgment hereafter, and of right and wrong 
deeds here; words entirely without meaning were there no such 
thing as a "free will" in man. 

But besides the fact that this argument from Omniscience 
springs from an analysis of our own definitions, it is also true, as 
I have shown above in relation to the argument from "the law of 
universal causation," that such an argument is itself based On the 
very intuitions it seeks to overthrow. If my creations are only 
fancied deeds, and self delusions, how can I possibly prove, or 
even imagine, such a thing as "a Creation" at all; -my intuitions 
being false, all conceptions based on those intuitions must them- 
selves be false. True, there might be, in such a case, a Creator 
and Ruler, and His Creation; but what possible conception could 
I form, either of Him, or of a Cosmos that had no possible rela- 
tion, or semblance to my fancied world of self hallucination? 

In fact such fatalistic conceptions agree far better with an 
extreme, mechanical Pantheism, and are not at all congruous to 
the idea of a Personal God. A loving, allwise Father, giving 
to His children personality, and a free will, to enable them to 
build up their characters, and work out their salvation; that is 
one conception. A Universe of unvarying laws — "Karma," or 



16 

"Fates/' — with beings who have for a few brief moments the 
delusion of personality, and then dissolve in death, like bubbles 
that float and burst in an illimitable ocean of being; that is an- 
other conception, having nothing in common with the previous 
one, but rather being utterly incompatible, and lying at the oppo- 
site pole of thought. 

To sum up then we may say that man must perforce be allowed 
to have a free will, circumscribed, it is true, but not governed, 
by the laws of the Universe, for no other supposition is logically 
coherent, or possible. As "a posteriori" proofs (and the only 
ones valid) of this, not only have we the positive arguments de- 
rived from the phenomena of self consciousness, of personality, 
and of thought, etc., and with which the "law of Atavism" is per- 
fectly congruous, but we have also the conclusive fact that Scien- 
tific Necessitarianism can only advance for itself arguments that 
are themselves founded on the very ideas, and instincts it seeks 
to overthrow; while a fatalism based on a religious definition is 
equally suicidical; and is besides far more coherent with a me- 
chanical, impersonal, and illogical Pantheism, than with the 
Heavenly Father of Christianity, or even the Personal God of 
Theism, and Natural Religion. 




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